


Design and Implementation of the PHaSE Core

Establishing Hardware Roots of Trust for
Safety-Critical Embedded Devices

Manoel Augusto de Souza Serafim

INTRODUCTION



- Authenticated Integrity
- Safety & Security
- Chains of Trust
- HRoT
- Conditional Control Flow
- Immutability
- Self-Tests (Weak)
- Revocation
- Cloning

TRUST

& the choice to be vulnerable.

- Risk & Trust boundaries?
- Trustworthiness?

RoT Storage (RoTS)
RoT Reporting (RoTR)
RoT Measurement (RoTM)

Severity/ Consequence (S)

	Negligible 1	Minor 2	Moderate 3	Major 4	Catastrophic 5
5 Almost certain	Moderate 5	High 10	Extreme 15	Extreme 20	Extreme 25
4 Likely	Moderate 4	High 8	High 12	Extreme 16	Extreme 20
3 Possible	Low 3	Moderate 6	High 9	High 12	Extreme 15
2 Unlikely	Low 2	Moderate 4	Moderate 6	High 8	High 10
1 Rare	Low 1	Low 2	Low 3	Moderate 4	Moderate 5

Likelihood (L)



arm TRUSTZONE

SOLUTIONS

CONTEXT

IBM



NIST's post-quantum cryptography standards are here

A TPM chip is a secure crypto-processor that is designed to carry out cryptographic operations. The chip includes multiple physical security mechanisms to make it tamper-resistant, and **malicious software is unable to tamper with the security functions of the TPM.** Jul 10, 2024



Microsoft Learn

<https://learn.microsoft.com> > hardware-security > tpm > t...

[Trusted Platform Module Technology Overview - Microsoft Learn](#)

Carnegie Mellon University

Search vulnerability notes

TCG TPM2.0 implementations vulnerable to memory corruption

REQUIREMENTS

Backward Compatibility

Supports legacy Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) without requiring major upgrades.

Security Through Transparency

Clear and verifiable security processes to enhance trust.

Future-Proof Design

Adaptable to address evolving threats and vulnerabilities.

Immutable Root of Trust

Ensures a tamper-proof foundation for security operations.

Resolder-Resistant Protection

Physical security measures to resist hardware tampering and resoldering attacks.

High Performance

Optimized for speed and low-latency cryptographic operations.

Interoperability

Replaces TPMs & Integrates with diverse hardware and software systems.

FIPS 140-3 Compliant


Meets standards for cryptographic hardware modules.

Efficient Patch Management


Supports updates and vulnerability patches without compromising security.

Programmable Hardware

Siloed Engine




IAP



SECURE BOOT

Validates images before they are allowed to execute.

- WORM
- SHA3... 2... 1
- RSA, ECDSA
- Time to ML-DSA & SLH-DSA?
- Cost?



BENCHMARKING


Table 1. Comparison of PHaSE Core and SLB 9670

Feature	PHaSE Core	SLB 9670
Construction	Sponge	Merkle-Damgard
Algorithm Considerations	Parallelizable in FPGA	No significant gains
Input	2MB Random Binary Image	
Hashing Time (ms)	48	944
Clock Speed	43 MHz Generated by PLL	43MHz
Number of Iterations	1000	

- No Fairness
- KECCAK
- Instruction vs Synthesis
- Monte Carlo
- SPI


FUTURE WORK

- Power Analysis
- Mitigations as a Testable Requirement
- PCB Design
- **LoadVault32** Integration
- ML-DSA, SLH-DSA & ML-KEM



OBRIGADO!

semiotic.gitbook.io



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Q&A!